

SLA CLAT SECTIONAL TEST — LEGAL CURRENT AFFAIRS Set 2

ANSWER KEY WITH EXPLANATIONS

PASSAGE 1 (Q1–Q6)

Q1. (B) The **Sabarimala Reference** arose because the 2018 Judgment was by a majority of four to one, so it was not unanimous, and the 2019 Court referred wider questions instead of deciding the reviews. The other three options state the passage's facts on the referral, the hearing dates and the observation of Justice Nagarathna.

Q2. (D) **Article 25** is expressly made subject to public order, morality, health and the other provisions of Part III, so equality can be applied to the ritual. A worshipper's label does not remove that limit, the Article 26 option misplaces ritual conduct, and no Judgment of the nine-Judge Bench has been delivered.

Q3. (C) The question targets the essential religious practices test itself, and only the argument that it forces judges into a theological task answers it directly. The autonomy and Article 14 arguments are the deference side's, and the remedy argument goes to whether Neeta may sue, not to the test itself.

Q4. (C) A reserved reference changes no law, so lower courts keep applying the **existing precedent** until the Judgment is delivered. Suspension of the earlier ruling, deference to an expected view and the claim that the reference ignores temple customs all misstate what the passage says.

Q5. (A) The passage lists health among the express limits on **Article 26**, and an infection threat is a health ground. The option that drops health misreads the text, the option needing a Bench Judgment invents a condition, and the subordination reasoning is not stated in the passage.

Q6. (D) The Bench only examined whether the difference in wording lets **Article 26** stand apart, and no Judgment exists. The bar on outsiders is the deference side's argument. Options that invent a holding either way, or that reach the sympathetic result for Leela, go beyond the passage.

PASSAGE 2 (Q7–Q12)

Q7. (A) The legal issue in the passage is whether Parliament can replace self-identification with board certification, or whether that goes against the rights

recognised in **National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India**. The other options invent issues on penalties, the reporting authority, or overruling the 2014 decision.

Q8. (B) The Amendment Act deleted **Section 4(2)** and, in operation since 25 May 2026, makes board certification the route to recognition. The Section 4(2) option ignores its deletion, the dignity option is a sympathetic but unlawful answer, and the Court has not decided validity.

Q9. (D) The Union's statement of 17 August 2026 covers identity cards issued under the 2019 Act, but only while the case is pending. Treating them as void ignores that assurance, the ninety-day rule is invented, and the 15 June 2026 order stayed High Court proceedings, not the Amendment Act.

Q10. (D) The Amendment Act requires hospitals to report gender-affirming procedures to the District Magistrate, and it was in force from 25 May 2026 even though its validity is open. The options postponing the duty, shifting it to the board, or sending the report to the board instead of the District Magistrate have no basis in the passage.

Q11. (C) The argument is that a statute cannot undo a declared right without removing the legal basis of that decision. Here the basis was Section 7, so its repeal meets the test. The last option ignores the basis condition, and the first two deny any legislative power at all.

Q12. (A) A refusal of interim relief only allows the Act to operate while the case is pending, so validity stays undecided and Article 21 arguments remain open. Treating the refusal as approval, or the notice as closing arguments, overreads it. The Act did operate from 25 May 2026.

PASSAGE 3 (Q13–Q18)

Q13. (A) The Court asked whether a right to be forgotten exists under Article 21 and how it balances against open justice and Article 19(1)(a), and held it is a facet of **informational privacy**. The damages suit, the open-justice supremacy and the stay-based refusal are not what the Judgment did.

Q14. (C) Persons acquitted or discharged are among those for whom relief is generally open, and **de-indexing** is an approved remedy. The option demanding deletion of reports overshoots, the option limiting relief to quashed or settled cases misreads the list, and open justice does not demand perpetual exposure.

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Q15. (A) Public figures whose matter still concerns public debate fall in the generally refused category even after acquittal. The fair-sounding option about a permanent mark ignores that category, the masking option misassigns the remedies, and a stay of another Court's order does not end the right.

Q16. (B) **Victims of sexual offences** appear among those for whom relief is generally open, while the refusal category is about people convicted of such offences. Extending that category to the victim confuses two groups. Masking is not reserved for acquitted persons, and open justice does not require a victim's name.

Q17. (D) The Court stressed that **de-indexing is not deletion** and approved only remedies that leave official court records untouched. Erasure is therefore unavailable, though de-indexing or masking is. The options claiming erasure, or denying the right altogether, each contradict the Judgment.

Q18. (B) A High Court Judgment binds only courts within its territory, so it binds the Delhi court but not the Kolkata court, and the **Supreme Court** has yet to settle the issue. The options extending it everywhere rely on the Article 21 basis or on pending status, and the Madras stay does not erase it in Delhi.

PASSAGE 4 (Q19–Q24)

Q19. (A) The Court reasoned that the chain begins with **ANI's works** being accessed and transmitted from India, so a foreign origin would undercut it. Output similarity and the research exception concern infringement, not jurisdiction, and the foreign servers were already treated as only the last step.

Q20. (D) The Court accepted that storage for training is reproduction, but held it covered by the research exception at this stage, which is not limited to non-commercial use and includes machine-led research. The first two options deny those points, and the third denies reproduction, which the Court accepted.

Q21. (B) The Court found that outputs which were not **substantially similar** to ANI's articles did not infringe. Sharing facts in new words is not that similarity. The options treating shared facts or training payment as infringement overreach, and the claim that outputs can never infringe is also unsupported.

Q22. (B) The Judgment in **ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. v. OpenAI Inc & Anr.** is a prima facie finding with the main suit pending, and the appeal only drew a notice. The

company's claim of finality fails on the first point, and the publisher's claim of an undone dismissal reads too much into notice.

Q23. (D) Jurisdiction follows the chain beginning in India, and storage for training is covered by the research exception at this stage. ANI lost on outputs for want of memorisation, so shown reproduction of a full article is different. The foreign-servers and all-outputs options contradict the reasoning.

Q24. (C) The Court concluded that irreparable injury would be caused to **OpenAI and the public** if an interim injunction were granted, so such harm is part of the interim decision. Excluding public harm, requiring a final finding first, or imposing a short injunction first has no basis in the passage.

PASSAGE 5 (Q25–Q30)

Q25. (B) Both statements appear in the passage. The reference question arose because **Deena** is a larger-Bench decision, and A stays true even if the Code provision had never been re-enacted, so R is a true fact that does not explain it.

Q26. (A) **Deena** was treated as a binding larger-Bench decision, which a smaller Bench cannot depart from without compelling new material, and only an argument of error is not that. Age of a ruling and a dignity claim do not lift the bar, and courts did examine the method here.

Q27. (C) The Court found no convincing evidence that lethal injection is more humane and treated the **Law Commission** recommendation as advisory. Contested foreign experience is therefore not compelling new material. Recency, a binding report and judicial direction to the Union all conflict with that reasoning.

Q28. (C) The ruling concerns only the method of execution and does not touch the death penalty, which stays confined to the rarest of rare cases under **Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab**. The options treating the method ruling as approval of the penalty, or as striking it down, both misdescribe it.

Q29. (B) The dismissal does not shut out a future challenge if compelling evidence emerges, and a peer-reviewed study could be such **new material**. Treating the 2026 dismissal as a bar, or the passage of time as ending Deena's authority, overreads it, and nothing excludes later evidence.

Q30. (A) The Court accepted the Union's submission that the method of execution is a matter of legislative policy

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and treated the Law Commission's recommendation as a suggestion for **Parliament**. The dismissal rejected a judicial change only. A larger-Bench permission, an exclusive-method finding, and a bar on acting on the report are not in the passage.

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